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The whole 1938 Czechoslovak crisis and especially the Munich Conference pro-
voked a vast amount of historical writing. In fact, there is hardly an aspect of the drama 
that has not been discussed from many, often diametrically opposed, points of view. The 
scale of opinions on Munich is particularly broad. For some, it was a failure on the part of 
Western democracies to face an imminent danger, an illustration of the contention that ap-
peasing aggressors is self-destructive. Others, however, side with the doyen of British 
historians, A.J.P. Taylor, and see in Munich a "triumph for British policy ... a triumph for 
all that was best and most enlightened in British life." 
My colleague, Professor William Keylor, examines the events in Central Europe 
which brought the world toward World War II as they were perceived by British and 
French decision-makers. I propose to look at the 1938 crisis from the perspective of the 
two important absentees at Munich, namely, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. The 
dismantling of the Czechoslovak Republic from September 1938 to March 1939 has been 
described in a number of competent studies. But historians have only a fuzzy understand-
ing of the Soviet role in the 1938 crisis. Moscow's options and intentions are hardly ever 
mentioned, even in specialized monographs on the Munich Conference. 
Ignoring Stalin's role in the Czechoslovak crisis makes little sense; by 1938 the So-
viet Union had established itself as a European force, ready to place its weight on the scales 
of power. Here are some of the questions that ought to be examined: was the Soviet Union 
prepared to live up to its obligations under the 1935 Czechoslovak -Soviet Treaty? If so, 
was it ready to go beyond its obligations and assist Czechoslovakia unilaterally, that is, 
without France? What objectives did Stalin set for himself regarding Czechoslovakia? 
What means did he utilize to achieve his goals? 
- -------- - -- - -
Sources: Disunity of Opinion 
By the rnid-1930s, Joseph Stalin's rule in the Soviet Union had developed into one 
of the most oppressive political systems in recorded history. Nevertheless, Moscow would 
emerge from the 1938 Czechoslovak Crisis in an excellent light. Its image would contrast 
sharply with that of the democracies, i.e., Great Britain and France, whose diplomats made 
no secret in the summer of 1938 that, in violation of their legally binding commitments, 
they were pushing Czechoslovak President Dr. Eduard Benes toward accepting Adolf 
Hitler's escalating demands and, eventually, capitulation. 
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, would go down in history as the one Euro-
pean power which was prepared to live up to its international obligations. Often quoted is 
the Soviet assurance to Prague that the Red Army was prepared to assist the Czechs "under 
any circumstances, even in spite of Munich." The authoritative History of Soviet Foreign 
Policy, edited by Boris Ponomaryov and Andrei Gromyko, no less, states that "at all stages 
of the Czechoslovak tragedy springing from the Munich betrayal, the Soviet Union was 
prepared to carry out its treaty obligations." Such assertions are clearly at variance with the 
way Soviet behavior was assessed by German diplomats who reported to Wilhelmstrasse 
that "the Soviet Union neither between September 19 and September 30 [1938] nor in the 
first half of September considered to start its military machinery and assist Czechoslovakia 
in a military manner." 
These signs of disunity among German and Soviet observers become less surpris-
ing when one considers that even Czech politicians who were directly involved in Prague's 
efforts to manage the 1938 crisis disagree about Stalin's role. For instance, Dr. Benes 
paints a flattering portrait of Moscow's behavior in his Memoirs. On the other hand, Ed-
uard Taborsky, Benes's secretary, thought that the Kremlin would not have and could not 
have assisted Czechoslovakia in any meaningful way. 
It is also worth noting that evidence regarding the Soviet role, both positive and 
negative, comes from unpredictable parts of the political spectrum. Thus, Rudolf Beran, a 
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Czech banker and conservative politician known for his extreme anti-Sovietism, stated ac-
cording to Pravda that "the only ally who remained faithful to Czechoslovakia was the So-
viet Union." But Eugene Loebl, an important pre-World War II member of the Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia, comes out on the other side: "In 1938 I was in a position to know 
that there was no unilateral offer of Soviet aid whatsoever." Even this brief review of 
sources indicates that the Soviet role in events immediately preceding the 1938 September 
Conference has produced some unlikely allies. 
In the following, I propose to examine four related areas of inquiry which have a 
direct bearing on the role of the Soviet Union during the 1938 Czechoslovak crisis. First, I 
will outline Benes's contribution to bringing the Soviet Union into the community of Eu-
ropean states in order to create a balance of power in Central Europe after Hitler's success 
in 1933. The second section looks at the Anschluj3 and its impact on the defensibility of 
Czechoslovakia. In the third section, I focus on the so-called partial mobilization of the 
Czechoslovak Army in May 1938 and I try to determine what factors may have contributed 
to Prague's decision to call up reservists. Finally, I seek to identify Stalin's diplomatic 
maneuvers during the escalating Czechoslovak crisis in September 1938. 
I. 
Benes 's Ostpolitik: 1933-1937 
Had it not been for Adolf Hitler's assumption of power in January 1933, 
Czechoslovakia might have stayed separate from, and unentangled with, the Soviet Union. 
But after Hitler had ceased being a mere beer-hall Putschist and became the official repre-
sentative of Germany, Benes knew he had to act. The rise ofHitlerism in Germany corre-
sponds clearly with Benes's Ostpolitik. He was not alone. Journal de Geneve summed up 
Europe's reaction to Hitler's success: "The fear which the Hitlerian regime inspires every-
where in Europe, its racist doctrine and its nationalistic claims have recently made many a 
Government turn to the Soviets for support and even alliance. Democracies and autocracies 
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alike vie with one another in paying court to the Kremlin." This fully applied to Benes. In 
June 1934, disregarding all domestic and international complications, the Czechoslovak 
Government recognized the Soviet Government de jure, exactly twelve years after its de 
facto recognition. 
In September, Benes achieved his next objective: the Soviet Union became a mem-
ber of the League of Nations. In his first speech at the League's Assembly, Vyacheslav 
Molotov recorded with gratitude "the initiative taken by the French Government. .. and the 
President of the Council, Dr. Benes, in the furtherance of this initiative." Simultaneously, 
Benes started working toward achieving a mutual assistance pact with Moscow. Only a 
political connoisseur can appreciate fully the refmed steps that Benes took. Instead of ap-
proaching the Soviet Union directly, Benes had first sought to bring Paris and Moscow to-
gether. This was meant to have two advantages. First, French involvement with the Soviet 
Union would stretch the field of Quai d'Orsay's operations so as to cover Czechoslovakia, 
left in a limbo by the Locarno Pact of 1925; second, the French action would legitimate 
Benes's own Soviet initiative, especially in the eyes of his opposition at home. 
Overall, Benes's political legacy is one of crucial strategic defeats (1938, 1948) re-
sulting, paradoxically, from scores of tactical successes. The Franco-Soviet Treaty of 
Mutual Assistance, signed in May 1935, was one of his many tactical victories. Only now, 
when the scene had been prepared and the principal actor insured, was Benes ready to go to 
Moscow himself. Merely a week after the signing of the Franco-Soviet Treaty, Benes was 
welcomed by Litvinov in Moscow "as an outstanding champion of international collabora-
tion and of reinforcing universal peace." 
The Franco-Soviet Treaty and the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty were closely inter-
twined: Article II of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty's Protocol of Signature stipulates that 
the Red Army would be required to march on behalf of Czechoslovakia "only insofar as ... 
aid will be accorded by France to the party who is victim of the attack." It remains unclear 
who insisted on the stipulation. It may have been added by the careful Benes who feared 
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that, in an emergency, Moscow could seize the initiative, force a corridor through Romania, 
and occupy Czechoslovakia on the invitation of a "provisional government," consisting of a 
few Moscow-trained "revolutionary workers." This explanation is not water-tight. 
The other possibility, namely, that the stipulation was inserted into the Treaty's text 
on the insistence of the Kremlin, appears plausible when one examines the changing tune 
Soviet sources. The authoritative Soviet Istoria diplomatii, published in 1945, states that 
Moscow had to make sure it would not be drawn into conflict under unfavorable conditions 
because it was "aware of the danger that France could place the burden of military assis-
tance to Czechoslovakia on the Soviet Union, if the Soviet aid was not directly related to 
assistance by France." In conclusion, Istoria diplomatii views the stipulation as "a wise 
reservation of Soviet diplomacy." Jiri Hochman has pointed out that once this work was 
safely out of print, other Soviet publications, e.g., Istoria mezhdunarodnych otnoshenii of 
1967, began developing a different theme: the stipulation was imposed on the Soviet nego-
tiators by Benes. The Czechoslovak president so mistrusted the socialist Soviet state that, 
guided by his bourgeois background, he used the stipulation as a security fence preventing 
a closer cooperation between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Soviet Union. 
The Czech delegation spent only nine days in the Soviet Union, but what one of its 
members had to share "confidentially" with the U.S. Ambassador in Prague upon his return 
deserves mention here: "Foreigners are given no opportunity of conversation with Rus-
sians," complained the Czech diplomat. Wherever the Czechoslovak delegation led by 
Benes went "they were followed by a host of secret agents. While in Moscow, the delega-
tion felt as if they were living in prison." Such impressions notwithstanding, Benes was 
proud of his achievements. He had no illusions about the nature of the Soviet regime but 
he, as others, preferred literally anybody to Hitler. 
Prague failed to understand especially the Poles: one day fighting, the next day 
signing non-aggressions pacts. Benes was particularly angered by the German-Polish 
Treaty of Non-Aggression of 1934. He viewed it as a catastrophe; it broke the isolation of 
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Nazi Germany, covered its eastern flank, and enabled the concentration of German military 
power against Czechoslovakia and Austria. Benes was convinced that he, contrary to the 
impulsive Poles, followed a historically correct, scientifically precise, dynamic, pragmatic, 
and logical foreign policy. 
During his 1935 trip to Moscow, Benes had a long conversation with William Bul-
litt, the first U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union. He explained that Germany's rearma-
ment had so altered the balance of power in Central Europe that it would be necessary to 
establish "the most intimate possible relations with the Soviet Union." He went on to say 
that the kernel of his entire policy was not to make the Soviet Union dominant in the region, 
but to produce a balance of power between the Soviet Union, Germany and Italy. 
But what kind of Soviet Union was Benes inviting to coproduce a balance of power 
in Central Europe? Less than one month before Benes outlined his geopolitical views to 
Bullitt, Stalin had delivered a chilling speech at a graduation of Red Army officers. It de-
scribed his treatment of the so-called opposition. It consisted, Stalin said, in "sweeping 
from the road all obstacles of any sort. True, in doing this, we had to give a drubbing to 
some ... comrades along the way. But this cannot be helped. I must admit that I also took 
a hand in this matter. (Strong applause, shouts of 'Hurrah!')" At the end, the graduating 
officers heard a story from Stalin, the point of which was that horses were more valuable 
than people. "Why should we pity people?" Siberian peasants once asked Stalin, "we can 
always make people. But a horse? Just try to make a horse." Without a doubt, such sen-
timents found a captive audience in Adolf Hitler. 
The spirit of Rapallo had suffered many setbacks after Hitler's MachtUhernahme in 
1933, but Stalin never gave up the view that Russia and Germany were bound by a special 
relationship. Many in Germany shared this sentiment. For instance, Count Ulrich von 
Brockdorff-Rantzau, the German Ambassador in Moscow, spoke of Schicksalgemeinschaft 
between Germany and the great Eastern Power. Despite Berlin's unbridled anti-Bolshevik 
propaganda, Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky stated at the height of the campaign that the 
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"Reichswehr has been the teacher of the Red Army and that will never be forgotten." The 
young Marshal remained at the forefront of Soviet signalling to Berlin through 1935, when 
Maxim Litvinov joined in, proposing a toast to the "restoration of the old friendship ." And 
to top it off, shortly before the end of 1935, the Soviet charge d'affaires in Berlin offered 
the Germans a bilateral pact of non-aggression, independent of any French or Czechoslo-
vak commitments and obligations. Although the Germans turned down the offer, these 
were the foundations of the Stalin-Hitler Pact of August 1939. 
By 1935, Hitler accelerated his pace. The Nuremberg Laws deprived Jews of all 
civil as well as human rights. In violation of the Versailles provisions, open military train-
ing was reintroduced in Germany and the British, instead of taking measures against this 
illegal act, signed a naval agreement which implicitly accepted, if not legitimated, this 
violation. Mussolini attacked Ethiopia in October 1935. By 1936 Hitler reoccupied the 
Rhineland and got involved in a bloody civil war in Spain. Equally dramatic developments 
occurred in the Far East. 
Under such circumstances, Prague was watching Moscow's behavior more and 
more closely. The news from the East was confusing. On the one hand, Benes learned 
about Tukhachevsky's conversation with Bullitt in which the Marshal had stated openly that 
"at the present moment the Soviet Union would be unable to bring any military aid to 
Czechoslovakia in case of Gennan attack." Prague also knew that Litvinov continued ne-
gotiations in Berlin for a 500 million mark credit. This had to have a chilling effect on the 
Czechoslovak president. 
On the other hand, Moscow told Benes indirectly, via Warsaw, that 
"Czechoslovakia can count on a full-scale Soviet help under any circumstances." This 
seemed to be confirmed publicly when Tukhachevsky told the Central Committee in Jan-
uary 1936 that the Red Army was prepared to fight simultaneously on Far Eastern and 
r--- Western fronts. Such war-like elan was further reaffirmed by Marshal Kliment 
Voroshilov, who stipulated that the Red Army took the offensive as its doctrine. He 
7 
warned in September 1936 that the Soviet Union, far from appeasing any potential aggres-
sor, would never allow the enemy to enter the Soviet Union. Instead, the Red Army was 
going to "strike him on the territory whence he came." 
The Soviets exposed the already disoriented President Benes to a barrage of con-
flicting information; in fact, this tactic developed into a full-scale Soviet policy toward 
Prague. One consequence was that the country's diplomats, never among the most popular 
in Western European capitals, now lost momentum and began badly failing in the struggle 
for public opinion in France and Great Britain. Despite the Nuremberg Laws, the Kristall-
nacht, and the Long Knives, which should have taught him about the nature of Hitler's 
Reich, William E. Dodd, the U.S. Ambassador to Berlin, opened his official report to 
Washington on Czechoslovak-German problems with this revealing sentence: "I have the 
honor to report that Czechoslovak-German relations continue to be troubled by incidents 
mostly of Czechoslovak making." 
What was even worse from Prague's point of view was the emergence of the myth 
that Czechoslovakia had become Stalin's Flugzeugmutterschiff. And it seemed that no 
amount of Czech arguments to the contrary was going to convince the world. At one point 
Prague felt so desperate that the German Military Attache and several of his colleagues from 
the diplomatic community in Prague were offered open inspections of any airport in the 
country, no matter how sensitive. Nevertheless, from 1935 to the Anschluj3, many in Eu-
rope lived under the impression that Stalin was building airfields in Czechoslovakia and that 
they were to serve as starting points for previously deployed Soviet bombers in an attack on 
Europe. This myth, and myth it was, was rendered even more serious by the fact that the 
Soviets had succeeded in building up enormous airborne army reserves by 1936. In 
September, Pravda described with excitement and pride one "spectacular operation involv-
ing a parachute jump and the reassembly, in battle formation, of 1,200 men." 
If foreign observers found the Red Army to be quite impressive in 1936, their 
views changed dramatically the next year. Between May 1937 and September 1938 the of-
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ficer corps of the Red Army was virtually decimated by Joseph Stalin's purge. As many as 
65% of all higher officers and 15% of all lower officers were executed or driven to suicide. 
There is no question that the mass slaughter weakened the Red Army substantially and 
caused its importance in European affairs to decline sharply. The purge did not weaken 
only the Soviet Union. It indirectly weakened also Vienna and Prague. The Soviet Union, 
upon which Benes relied to coproduce a balance of power in Central Europe, now seemed 
to be in the process of committing a multiple public hara-kiri. Ironically, Benes was tricked 
into playing a role in the purge of the Red Army. On this, more below. 
From then on, Czechoslovakia's position would get only worse. By the end of 
1937, the Times of London began expressing the idea that Hitler's irritation with 
Czechoslovakia was well-founded. After several explicitly anti-Czechoslovak articles, Hu-
bert Ripka, a man with excellent connections in the Prague Government, summed up the 
situation: "One must assume that the pro-German British would not care if Czechoslovakia 
would surrender and thus substantially increase the power and influence of Germany 
throughout the world." 
II. 
1938: The AnschlujJ 
In early 1938, a French editor asked Litvinov whether the Soviet Union would 
consider a reorientation of its foreign policy. Litvinov could not have been more honest: 
"Why not?" And is there a possibility of a rapprochement with Germany? "Why not?" It 
would require, he continued, "merely a note to the German Government stating that the 
Soviet Government would offer no opposition to German designs in Europe." 
Hitler occupied Austria on 13 March 1938. The Wehrmacht showed itself a poor 
performer on the Austrian "battlefield," where the only obstacles were too enthusiastic 
crowds of Austrian Nazis who rushed to the streets to throw flowers in the path of German 
mechanized columns, thereby slowing down their advance. Yet, those very columns man-
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aged to break down near Linz because of a minor snowstorm. Czech diplomats seized on 
this and tried to portray the AnschlufJ as a failure. Nevertheless, it was clear to all military-
minded people in Czechoslovakia that the new situation was disastrous: Hitler in Austria 
meant that the country's undefended soft underbelly was exposed to a surgical strike by the 
Wehrmacht. 
Coincidentally, when Frantisek Moravec, the Chief of Czechoslovak Military Intel-
ligence, was up for promotion to a full colonel in 1936, he had to appear before a board of 
General Staff officers. He was given a fictitious strategic situation and expected to demon-
strate his ability to make correct judgements, arrive at swift decisions, and issue the appro-
priate orders to troops at his disposal. The scenario was as follows: "Czechoslovakia has 
been attacked by Germany. Hungary and Austria are also hostile. Poland still neutral, but 
potentially hostile. France has not mobilized yet and the Little Entente has only started. 
Present military solution for Czechoslovakia." The candidate answered in one sentence: 
"The problem has no military solution." Since Moravec was in fact promoted, despite his 
refusal to engage the enemy militarily under the given circumstances, it seems that the Gen-
eral Staff of the Czechoslovak Army shared his pessimistic view. Yet, after the AnschlujJ 
the reality was worse than the 1936 worst-case scenario. 
Benes had little hope that his country was going to defend itself militarily. But he 
was not resigned. First of all, he had faith in his "scientifically" designed system of inter-
national treaties and, secondly, he was convinced that Hitler's domestic situation was far 
from stable. He told Colonel Moravec that "such regimes as Hitler's, based on violence 
and oriented toward the lowest human instincts, must fall after the first failure. That is a 
sociological law." But who was going to bring about Hitler's first failure? 
1938: After the AnschlujJ 
Immediately after the AnschlujJ, Moscow intensified its barrage of conflicting in-
formation targeted at Benes and his French ally. For instance, Soviet diplomats in Paris 
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assured the French Prime Minister that the Soviet Union would go immediately to 
Czechoslovakia's assistance if France did so, in case of attack by Germany. In Warsaw, 
however, the Soviets were telling a different story: they would march if France did, but a 
corridor would have to be provided for their assistance to Czechoslovakia. In Moscow, 
Litvinov told U.S. Ambassador Joseph Davies that the Red Army might go to the assis-
tance of Czechoslovakia even though France did not. Meanwhile, influential members of 
the French communist party were spreading yet another story in diplomatic circles: the So-
viet Union would not fight for Czechoslovakia, and Germany would therefore gain mastery 
over the region without provoking a general war. And finally, Litvinov, less than a week 
after his surprising suggestion of unilateral Soviet assistance, informed the U.S. Ambas-
sador that France had no confidence in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union had no confi-
dence in France, and Czechoslovakia would surrender voluntarily. Prague picked up most 
of such reports and found them, of course, confusing and contradictory. As if this was not 
enough, Ward Price, a British journalist, arrived in Prague and told the Czechoslovak For-
eign Ministry that President Benes should fly to Berlin, kneel before the Fuhrer and agree 
to Czechoslovakia being limited to small areas around Prague. 
Benes tried to crack the mystery of the Soviet position in case of a German attack 
upon Czechoslovakia. He instructed his Ambassador in Moscow, Zdenek Fierlinger, to 
force the Soviets to reveal their cards. But Fierlinger could report only more of the same: 
conflicting signals. On March 15, Litvinov had only a series of conditions for the Czech 
Ambassador: if France did not evade, if she gave Germany a direct and effective rebuff, 
then Britain would be compelled to follow, like it or not. And the Soviet Union? Nobody 
had ever been able to reproach the Soviet Union with evading its international obligations. 
Yet, only one day later, on March 16, Litvinov sounded upbeat: he stated to Fierlinger that 
the Soviet Union would carry out its treaty obligations toward Czechoslovakia "as a matter 
of course." In reply to a further question, regarding how the USSR could help, he replied 
that some sort of corridor was certain to be found. 
• 
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Finally, on 17 March, Litvinov stated that his government was prepared to "join in 
collective action" against aggression. And what kind of collective action? Litvinov spelled 
it out: the Soviet government would "proceed immediately to discuss practical measures ... 
with other Powers in the League of Nations or outside it." If the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe 
pounced at Czech, Moravian, and Slovak cities, Benes was hoping for meaningful military 
assistance, not debates in Geneva. Furthermore, Litvinov's promise to bring Czechoslo-
vakia's case before the League was in violation of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 1935; 
Article II of the Treaty imposes on the Parties the legal obligation "immediately to come to 
each other's aid and assistance" in the case of "an unprovoked aggression on the part of a 
European State." At a minimum, Article I of the Treaty calls on the Parties to undertake 
"immediate consultation" if one of them should be threatened or in danger of aggression 
from any European state. Therefore, Litvinov's promise to get involved in a collective ac-
tion, particularly given the sorry record of the League of Nations with regard to the Italian 
aggression in Ethiopia and the Civil War in Spain, not to mention the conflicts in the Far 
East, was really a slap across Benes's face. 
III. 
May 1938 
Perusal of contemporary Czech newspapers and periodicals shows that there was 
little if any public despairing in May 1938. In fact, Prague felt quite confident. There were 
as yet no serious indications that France would disregard its obligations toward Czechoslo-
vakia, a country perceived by many to have been a French creation. And the Soviet Union 
accelerated its involvement in the developing Czechoslovak crisis. As far as Soviet military 
assistance was concerned, it was hoped that it would take the shape of air support. The 
Red Air Force was thought of highly, but the effectiveness of the Red Army after its 
decapitation in the Big Purge was deemed doubtful, certainly outside the Soviet Union. 
Furthermore, there was a feeling in Prague, not shared by most members of the small but 
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prestigious Communist Party, that if the Red Army actually marched into Czechoslovakia, 
the country would suffer as much hardship from the "hordes of troops ... as from the in-
vading force," according to a U.S. Embassy report. 
Soviet diplomats in several European capitals, almost in a united voice, offered 
variations on one major theme: the situation was grave, but not hopeless. It could be im-
proved only if all Powers, including the Soviet Union, joined in a system directed against 
Hitler's Third Reich. I will try to demonstrate that Moscow wanted to create such a sys-
tem, drive it into conflict with Hitler-- and stand aside. 
In March, Benes and others in Prague had been saying that the Red Army's assis-
tance, partly because of the Big Purge, had ceased being a serious factor in their decision-
making. By May, however, there was a new sense of optimism regarding the Soviet card 
in the Czech foreign affairs community. It was not a coincidence. On 8 May, Mikhail 
Kalinin, titular head of the Soviet Union, assured a visiting Czechoslovak delegation that 
Moscow would fulfill its treaty obligations toward Czechoslovakia and France "to the last 
letter." There may have been some other positive Soviet signals to Benes, because some-
time before 13 May, the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry had indicated to U.S. diplomats its 
"positive belief" that Moscow would come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia within 
twenty-four hours. Prague also believed that the recent visit to Bucharest by the Soviet 
Ambassador to Prague, Sergei Alexandrovsky, was designed to reach a Soviet-Romanian 
understanding regarding the transfer of Soviet troops over Romanian territory to 
Czechoslovakia in case of war. All in all, Benes and his friends in the Prague Castle prob-
ably shared the Soviet line that the situation was grave, but not hopeless. 
The Czechoslovak "Partial" May 1938 Mobilization 
The "partial" mobilization of 20-21 May, 1938, played an important role in the 
whole Munich drama. Its analysis is crucial for an understanding of Stalin's diplomatic 
maneuvers during the Czechoslovak crisis. Interestingly, it is hardly ever mentioned in 
1 3 
Soviet accounts of the crisis. For instance, Ambassador Maiski omits the event altogether 
in a volume of some 530 pages. 
Claiming hostile military maneuvers by the Wehrmacht during the night of 20-21 
May, Czechoslovakia called up one year-class of reservists and five classes of technical 
troops, the latter consisting of 47,000 men in aircraft and security services, 24,000 in the 
SOS (Straz obrany statu, State defense guard), and 25,000 specialists. The reservists, to-
gether with the standing Army, marched into the Sudetenland and occupied the front-line 
fortifications. They could hold the frontier and prevent a possible German surprise attack. 
If Hitler were to move there would be a shooting war. The reservists reported for duty 
promptly and with enthusiasm; after many months of passivity, uncertainty, and humilia-
tion the course now seemed clear: Czechoslovakia was not Austria, it was not going to be 
wiped out without an organized, liberty-or-death kind of defense. 
The May mobilization turned out to have had a positive influence upon the commu-
nal and municipal elections which took place on 22 May. The vote was decisively against 
Radical Right parties, while anti-Fascist parties gained. The National Socialists, who were 
generally thought to have the support of President Benes, ended up with a bloc of 35%. 
However, having mobilized, Prague now discovered to its great embarrassment that 
the Wehrmacht had made no aggressive moves whatsoever. It resorted to fabrications; for 
instance, the Czechoslovak Military Attache, Colonel Hron, claimed that German troops 
had been moving toward the Czechoslovak frontiers, but he failed to provide any basis for 
his assertion. The truth was that, for once, Hitler was neither a liar nor an aggressor. The 
British Military Attache posted in Prague, Colonel H.C.T. Strange, a loyal friend of the 
democratic cause, drove all around Saxony and Silesia, but found no traces of military 
movements. German documents captured at the end of the War also demonstrate that in 
May 1938 there had been no Wehrmacht offensive in the making. 
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The May mobilization made a most dramatic impact on Adolf Hitler. The swift and 
enthusiastic Czech strategic troop concentration brought about, Berlin felt, a loss of Ger-
man prestige. Enraged and humiliated, Hitler sat down to rewrite the Operation Green di-
rective, that is, the German plan for Czechoslovakia's destruction. He crossed out the first 
sentence ("It is not my intention to smash Czechoslovakia by military action ... ") and 
wrote instead: "It is my unalterable intention to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in 
the nearest future." This alone attests to the importance of the May mobilization and it is in-
triguing that the cause of it is not so obvious. 
"What is the explanation of this mysterious episode?" asks A.J.P. Taylor, 
"Certainly not the Russians who were as surprised as everybody else." I believe that Tay-
lor's statement is in error and that Moscow in fact may have manipulated Prague into the 
May mobilization. 
The key to Soviet thinking can possibly be found in an 11 May conversation be-
tween Litvinov and a Czech diplomat, Arnost Heidrich, in Geneva. In a rare fit of glas-
nost', the Soviet diplomat described to Heidrich Moscow's overall approach to the 
Czechoslovak crisis. Soviet leaders did not "intend to enter the coming war at the begin-
ning." Instead, they were going to "stand by until near the end when they would be able to 
step in" and arrange the remnants of the inferno according to Soviet designs. 
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Even if the account of Litvinov's talk with Heidrich is correct, and even if Litvinov 
was telling the truth, we still do not know exactly how the Soviet Union would have been 
able to manipulate Prague into mobilizing against a nonexistent German offensive. It ought 
to be considered that the Czechoslovak-Soviet contacts were not merely on the diplomatic 
level, via Sergei Alexandrovsky in Prague or Fierlinger in Moscow. There was also Kle-
ment Gottwald, the Czechoslovak Communist Party boss, who travelled frequently be-
tween the two capitals and was received by Benes at the height of the crisis. 
The May Mobilization and Soviet Intelligence 
There was one other channel of communication between Prague and Moscow: their 
intelligence services. Colonel Frantisek Moravec asserts in his Merrwirs that the 
Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 1935 contained a secret protocol on cooperation in the intel-
ligence field. In 1936, on the basis of this agreement, Moravec, and other officers from the 
Czechoslovak Army's Second Bureau (Military Intelligence), were ordered by the General 
Staff to travel to Moscow. 
A group of six Czech intelligence officers arrived in Moscow in the summer of 
1936. They were received at the train station by General Uritsky, and introduced to Mar-
shal Tukhachevsky, who welcomed the Czechs "as representatives of our ally . ... You are 
the first foreigners who will enter [the] building [of our Rozvedka, the espionage service]." 
The purpose of the meeting was, inter alia, for the two parties to share information about 
the Wehrmacht and to agree about the most appropriate ways for the parties to cooperate in 
gathering and exchanging information of an urgent nature. 
The Soviets gave away virtually nothing during the meeting, partly, Colonel 
Moravec suspected, because they were both deceitful and ignorant. But they presented 
many tall orders. Uritsky, for instance, suggested that, to begin with, one hundred Soviet 
r-- intelligence officers should be "trained, briefed and prepared" in Czechoslovakia and thence 
deployed as resident-agents, mostly to Germany. This seemed too much for the Czech ne-
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gotiators, who finally agreed to form one joint intelligence center in Prague, which was to 
be permanently staffed by one Soviet intelligence officer whose support personnel would 
be Czech. Moravec felt good about having brought the original Soviet request for one 
hundred intelligence officers down to one. But he dreaded how such cooperation, fruitless 
from Prague's perspective, was going to influence Czechoslovak relations with Poland. 
His concern, of course, was justified. Soon after his return from Moscow, Poland, obvi-
ously not without its sources in the Soviet capital, strongly protested that Czechoslovakia 
allowed a Soviet intelligence operation against Poland from Czechoslovak territory. War-
saw rejected any claims of Czech innocence and recalled its liaison intelligence officer. 
Colonel Moravec determined th_at Soviet military intelligence was relying mostly on 
ideological agents, primarily members of the German Communist Party. But after three 
years of concentrated efforts by the Gestapo, German communists could hardly have 
gained and maintained access to sensitive military and intelligence sources. And the Big 
Purge, of course, did not bypass Soviet intelligence. General Uritsky himself fell into the 
bottomless pit of the Stalin purge less than a year after Moravec had met him in the summer 
of 1936. 
Nevertheless, in the fall of 1936, the first Soviet officer arrived in Prague, and 
Moscow put the new base for intelligence operations to good use almost instantly. In Oc-
tober, the Soviets requested and received Czechoslovak assistance in infiltrating Soviet 
agents to Western Europe. President Benes and Foreign Minister Karnil Krofta agreed to 
equip the Soviets with Czechoslovak passports. On occasion, Czech intelligence officers 
even travelled with the Soviets, who lacked the sophistication of international travellers, to 
put it mildly. Moravec recalls that, during one operation, his service had helped to infiltrate 
150 Soviet officers to Western Europe; of these, 120 actually made it, others having been 
returned by the vigilant Swiss. 
President Benes and Prime Minister Krofta were involved in another operation, one 
with serious implications for the Red Army, the Soviet Union, but also Czechoslovakia. 
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Ivan Pfaff and Walter Laqueur have shown that throughout 1936, the Czechs had been ap-
proached by a variety of less than sincere characters, including White Russian double and 
triple agents, German diplomats, and Nazis, such as Hermann Goering and the Gestapo 
chief Heinrich MUller. They offered documents implicating Marshal Tukhachevsky as head 
of a large Red Army conspiracy, in cahoots with certain Wehnnacht elements, against 
Stalin. It seems more than likely that Marshal Tukhachevsky and some of his colleagues 
thought of the Rapallo period with nostalgia and regretted the breakdown of Soviet-German 
cooperation, particularly in the military area. But the documents made available to Benes 
had been forged. There is now evidence indicating that in February 1937 a White Russian 
General, Nikolai Skoblin, met with Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the SS secret service, and 
the two designed a disinformation operation targeting Tukhachevsky. Their material was 
delivered to the Czechs. 
In late April and early May 1937, there were four meetings between Benes, Krofta 
and the Soviet Ambassador in Prague, Sergei Alexandrovsky. The Czechs, convinced that 
they were acting to protect their Soviet ally, presented the "evidence" against Marshal 
Tukhachevsky to the Soviet Ambassador. Since Skoblin was a Soviet agent and because 
Tukhachevsky had been implicated already in the Pyatakov-Radek Trial, it is almost certain 
that Stalin was not the innocent victim of a German diabolical disinformation operation. 
Instead, he used the Skoblin-Heydrich forgeries to trigger the 1937 Purge of the Red 
Army, knowing full well that the evidence had been forged. Of course, only Stalin knew 
why he was doing it. 
Colonel Moravec had a distinctly low opinion of the Soviet military intelligence. It 
seemed unsophisticated, lacking in basic political and military understanding of Germany. 
That may well be so, but it was not the whole picture. The Rote Kapalle, one of the most 
successful intelligence operations of World War II, could not have been put together and 
conducted by the primitives Moravec describes. A history of the organization suggests that 
around 1937 or 1938, Le Grand Chef of the Rote Kapelle, Leopold Trepper, discussed the 
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creation of a network in Czechoslovakia. Contacts between the Czechoslovak and Soviet 
intelligence services continued even after Colonel, later General, Frantisek Moravec moved 
his service to London in March 1939. Finally, Rudolf Roessler, a.k.a. Lucy, one of the 
best Soviet World War II agents, was partly handled by the Czechoslovak intelligence ser-
vice representative in Switzerland, Karel Sedlacek, a.k.a. Simpson. Roessler was in fact 
so close with the Czechoslovak service that he agreed to be reactivated two years after the 
war. The Swiss arrested him for espionage, not for the first time, in March 1953, the 
month Stalin died. 
Did Prague Mobilize in May on a Soviet Tip? 
Here is how the political and intelligence channels between Prague and Moscow 
may have been used to bring about a Czechoslovak mobilization. According to one source, 
on 23 April, the Czechs had provided "a number" of Soviet intelligence agents with facili-
ties to cross clandestinely into Germany. The demand was granted. On 15 May, the U.S. 
and French Ambassadors in Moscow, Davies and Coulondre, were told by the Soviets that 
the Wehrmacht was on the point of invading Czechoslovakia. On 20 May, Soviet intelli-
gence officers started returning from Germany en masse via Czechoslovakia. Each had the 
same story to tell: the Wehrmacht is about to attack Czechoslovakia. That very night 
Prague declared the "partial" mobilization. 
The argument that Prague mobilized in May as a result of Soviet disinformation is 
strengthened considerably when one examines the Soviet press. The mobilization was re-
ported by TASS on 22 May; the agency simply stated that the Czechoslovak Government 
had called up a class of reservists and sent military units to the German frontier. No other 
comment was offered. The next day, Soviet media resorted to the "second degree." 
Moscow papers carried news dispatches under foreign date lines on the Czech situation, but 
refrained from any editorial comment. Stalin was waiting for the situation to develop in one 
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way or another, while preserving for himself the complete freedom to choose sides once the 
dust had begun to settle down. 
On 23 May, a Soviet official told the U.S. Ambassador that it would be an error to 
expect a repetition of the Austrian affair, "for Czechoslovakia would fight." Meanwhile, 
the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow "received renewed assurances that the Soviet 
Government will do its utmost to assist Czechoslovakia." On 24 May, four days after the 
mobilization, still not a word from the Kremlin appeared in the official press. The next 
day, Pravda announced that should Hitler choose to attack, "the direct responsibility will 
rest upon the Governments of England and France." The paper said nothing about the atti-
tude of the Soviet Union. 
Finally, on 26 May, the Kremlin published its opinion. Izvestia brought out an 
article which declared sympathy with the timely mobilization. It was one of the reasons 
why Hitler had to postpone his aggression. The other was the determination of the French 
to carry out their obligations. The article concluded: "the fact that no one doubts the loyalty 
of the USSR to the obligation which it has assumed played a tremendous role." 
The Soviet silence during the gravest crisis so far was well understood by German 
observers in Moscow. Ambassador Count Friedrick Werner von Schulenburg's summary 
of the Soviet attitude toward the May mobilization stated that Soviet diplomacy made every 
effort in Paris, London, and Prague to influence the respective governments and was likely 
"to have recommended an energetic course of action and a firm attitude toward Germany." 
The Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow, reported Schulenburg, "kept in constant touch 
with Litvinov .. .. It looks as ifLitvinov advised the Czechoslovak Government in these 
conversations as well as through the Soviet Minister in Prague." 
At the same time, Schulenburg reported, the Soviet Union would be unwilling to 
march on behalf of Czechoslovakia. After all, "The Soviet Government. .. is hardly likely 
to allow the Red Army, created for its own protection and to further world revolution, to 
march in defense of a bourgeois state." There is other evidence that the Kremlin had at-
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tempted to manipulate Prague into a conflict with Hitler. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow 
reported on 22 May that Fierlinger, the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow, "was in 
constant touch with the Soviet authorities who were manifesting 'one hundred percent pes-
simism' on the possibility that war could be avoided." The report than stated that in Pier-
linger's view the Soviets had in fact already taken "certain military measures." 
The Soviet Union's modus operandi during the May crisis was based on the 
premise that a European war was not to be feared, as long as it took place outside the Soviet 
Union. Stalin did not fear war. He feared isolation which would sooner or later result in 
an attack on the Soviet Union. Moscow had realized by April and May that its influence 
upon international affairs began decreasing as a result of the Red Army purge, the suspi-
cious political trials, and the failure in Spain. 
Therefore, the Kremlin struggled to bring about or at least to accelerate the outbreak 
of the Czechoslovak-German war. Prague was falsely informed by the Soviet Union by 
diplomatic as well as intelligence channels that Hitler would attack any minute. Stalin ex-
pected that, possibly, the unprovoked Czechoslovak mobilization would make the impul-
sive Hitler unleash the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe on Prague; France, and eventually, Great 
Britain would declare war on Hitler; and the Soviet Union could sit, wait, watch, choose 
and join at the right time on the right side. Such a conflict outside the Soviet Union's bor-
der appeared to be a guarantee against a Franco-British-German rapprochement, which 
would constitute the greatest threat to Soviet security. No definitive proof that Moscow had 
deliberately manipulated Prague into mobilizing in May has been presented. Therefore, the 
above remains merely a working hypothesis. 
IV. 
European Diplomacy on the Road to Munich 
To stress their preference for diplomatic over military solutions, the British dis-
patched to Prague Lord Runciman who was supposed to find a peaceful solution to the 
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Czechoslovak-German conflict. He arrived in early August and it was a bad omen that the 
British Ambassador in Prague, Basil Newton, insisted on bringing to the train station and 
introducing to members of the Runciman mission Messrs. Ernst Kundt and Wilhelm Se-
bekovsky of the Sudeten German Party. 
That proved to be only the beginning. It transpired that some members of the 
Runciman group felt free to return the Nazi salute, and Andor Hencke, Counselor of the 
German Embassy in Prague, reported to Berlin that Lord Runciman's secretary had said 
that he had a "great understanding for the Sudeten German Party's attitude of dislike for the 
Jews in Czechoslovakia, whom he described as not comparable with British Jews." Such 
sentiments were not rare. 
In the summer of 1938, diplomatic reports from London, Paris, Berlin, and other 
important European centers seemed almost unanimous in their mistrust of Prague, cautious 
sympathy for the German demands, and overwhelming desire to prevent war, cost what it 
may. In June 1938, G.S. Messersmith, U.S. Ambassador to Vienna, cabled to Washing-
ton a strictly confidential memorandum, which presents a devastating portrait of his diplo-
matic colleagues. Writing about Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador in Berlin, 
Messersmith warned that he was not the only Englishman expressing the view that "there 
was no excuse for the existence of Austria and Czechoslovakia." Newton, the British Am-
bassador in Prague, expressed "much the same view as Henderson was expressing in 
Berlin." Hadow of the British Legation in Prague, also stated that "Austria and Czechoslo-
vakia had no right to separate existence." He believed that German hegemony in South-
eastern Europe was not only inevitable, but desirable. The British Ambassador in Paris 
stated flatly that "Churchill was a fool and his present activities criminal." 
September 1938 
Throughout August, Stalin continued exposing President Benes to conflicting sig-
nals regarding Soviet behavior in case of a Czechoslovak-German war. Soviet diplomats 
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stationed in European capitals issued one statement after another, often full of semantic 
subtleties, leaving Prague confused. Both the French and the Czechs tried to get a clearer 
picture of Moscow's plans in case of a shooting war; they were told, correctly, that France 
was under an obligation to assist Czechoslovakia irrespective of Soviet help. 
Several U.S. diplomatic sources reported to Washington that the aim of the Soviet 
Union seemed to be "to create a second Spain" in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet press and 
official sources remained virtually silent regarding Soviet options in case of an unprovoked 
German attack on Czechoslovakia. But members of the Comintern, mainly in France, be-
gan spreading wild, but invariably optimistic, rumors that the Red Army would 
"immediately march to aid Czechoslovakia." Another fabrication, discussed passionately 
by Western diplomats from Moscow to London, involved the story that Stalin had warned 
Prague: if any further concessions are made to Berlin the Soviet Union would cease feeling 
bound by the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 1935. At the same time, rumors were being 
spread throughout Europe that the Soviet Air Force had begun delivering bombers to 
Czechoslovakia. None of that was true. 
Unofficially, the Soviet Union sought to portray itself as ready to fight on 
Czechoslovakia's behalf or, at a minimum, to join an anti-Hitler front. Officially, Soviet 
diplomacy tried to achieve a seat for itself in a Munich-like conference. The Czechoslovak 
Ambassador, Fierlinger, saw Litvinov on 5 September to ascertain what the Soviet Union 
might do in case of a German attack. Litvinov told him that Soviet plans could be dis-
cussed, but that the League of Nations could not be ignored. The problem, Fierlinger was 
advised, "must be discussed by all parties involved." This was a resurrection of an old 
theme; but what seemed merely unfortunate in March had a devastating effect upon Benes 
in September. 
On 12 September, Hitler delivered his famous Nuremberg speech. In reference to 
,-... the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia, Hitler stressed he was in "no way willing that 
here in the heart of Germany through the dexterity of other statesmen a second Palestine 
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should be permitted to arise. The poor Arabs are defenseless and perhaps deserted. The 
Germans in Czechoslovakia are neither defenceless nor are they deserted, and folk should 
take notice of that fact." And the Soviet response to the Nuremberg speech? It was not 
mentioned in any Moscow newspapers. 
Only two days after the Nuremberg speech, Moscow came up with a devastating 
suggestion: with no reference to Hitler's threats to their Czechoslovak ally and no mention 
of a possible common front against Hitler, the Soviet Union now suggested an international 
conference dealing with Czechoslovakia. "At last even in London," writes Journal of 
Moscow, "the necessity of a consultation between France, England, and the Soviet Union 
on the Czech problem with the eventual participation of the U.S . is spoken of." Naturally, 
this was again in direct violation of the terms of the Czechoslovak -Soviet Treaty of 1935. 
Soviet intentions toward Czechoslovakia were further put to test after the Franco-
British ultimatum of 19 September. On that day, France and Great Britain suggested that 
Benes give up the Sudeten territory to Hitler: "Czechoslovakia's vital interests cannot 
effectively be assured unless these areas are now transferred to the Reich." With this doc-
ument before him, Benes sent for Alexandrovsky, the Soviet Minister in Prague. There 
was one crucial question he had to ask: "What will be the attitude of the Soviet Union if 
France refuses to fulfill her obligations?" This is Benes's version of the question. Alexan-
drovsky recorded a different type of question, one inquiring whether the USSR was going 
to assist Czechoslovakia as a member of the League of Nations on the basis of the League's 
Covenant. It does not take much speculation to see that Alexandrovsky's version makes 
little sense. Benes needed military assistance from an ally who was bound by the Treaty of 
1935, not assurances from a member of the notoriously slow and inefficient League. 
Although the Soviet Embassy received a response from Moscow on 20 September 
in the afternoon, Alexandrovsky went to see Benes only the next day. The delay was cru-
cial. Benes had first rejected the Franco-British ultimatum on 20 September at 7 p.m. But 
seven hours later, reacting, in part, to another visit by the British and French Ambassadors, 
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-amidst tears, Benes decided to give up. Now was the time for Alexandrovsky to show up 
with his answer. Since Benes had already given up, and because the crucial question had 
been distorted, Stalin had nothing to lose by saying "yes, in every respect!" This was a 
sophisticated diplomatic maneuver which gave the Soviet side the appearance of a positive 
initiative without any responsibility. Moscow was going to repeat this trick a few days 
later. 
For the moment, it continued the pattern of conflicting signals. On 21 September, 
Litvinov spoke in Geneva. The Soviet Union, he told the League of Nations, was going to 
render Czechoslovakia immediate and effective aid "if France, loyal to her obligations, ren-
dered similar assistance .. . . " The next day, the Soviet government effectively warned 
Poland against seeking to exploit the Czechoslovak crisis by grabbing a chunk of territory 
for itself. But on 24 September, the Soviet Union pointedly ignored Romania's decision to 
allow a transfer of Soviet troops, guns and ammunition from the Soviet Union to 
Czechoslovakia across Romanian territory. "The Royal Government of Romania," said the 
official note from Bucharest to Litvinov, "recognizes solemnly and objectively the right of 
transfer by rail of the Red Army across Romania to Czechoslovakia, including the transport 
of men, light as well as heavy weaponry, munitions and provisions of all kinds." The note 
further urged the Soviets to commence the transfer immediately upon Germany's attack on 
Czechoslovakia. Moscow did not respond. The existence of this document, surfaced by 
Ivan Pfaff and published by Jiri Hochman in his 1982 dissertation, has never been ac-
knowledged by the Soviet Union. 
Although Benes had all but surrendered on 21 September, two days later he 
changed his mind. In response to a British and French communication and a tremendous 
domestic desire to fight German Nazism with good Czech weapons and behind solid 
Czechoslovak fortifications, the Czechoslovak government declared a general mobilization. 
In the Czech districts of Bohemia and Moravia, the response of the soldiers was over-
whelming. The U.S. Embassy described railroad stations full of "cheering, laughing 
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crowds packed into trains frontierwards .... There was no confusion, but everyone fell 
into places with utmost promptitude." Other reports stated that men were at their posts 
within six hours. There were in fact serious problems with the German recruits in the 
Czechoslovak Army, but for the moment observers saw a fme, strong, and gung-ho army 
ready to do the utmost in defense of liberty. 
The general mobilization of 23 September had a positive effect throughout 
Czechoslovakia. Two days later Jan Masaryk, Prague's Minister in London, rejected the 
Godesberg Memorandum of 23 September in which Hitler demanded a Czechoslovak 
evacuation of the Sudeten regions, broadly defined, within five days. Masaryk told the 
British Foreign Office that Hitler's demands were "absolutely and unconditionally unac-
ceptable," and pointed out that the Czechs would "not be a nation of slaves." Even Cham-
berlain, who probably had gone to Godesberg prepared to surrender, was appalled by the 
extent as well as the form of Hitler's demands. Consequently, they were rejected by 
Prague, but also by London and Paris. 
However, even before Masaryk announced in London Prague's rejection of the 
Godesberg platform, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had sent a personal note 
to Hitler in the evening of 25 September. He asked the Fuhrer not to take the expected 
Czechoslovak refusal of Godesberg as the "last word." He suggested an international con-
ference to deal with the Sudeten problem, an idea which Prague accepted. 
Hitler prepared the atmosphere for the conference with his brutally belligerent 
speech in the Sportpalast on 26 September. Now he demanded "self-determination" not 
only for the Sudetens, but all the other minorities in Czechoslovakia. Hitler stated omi-
nously "now two men stand arrayed one against the other. There is Mr. Benes and here 
stand I. .. " For now, Hitler accepted Chamberlain's proposal to meet again, this time in 
Munich. British and French diplomats, instead of energetically capitalizing on the momen-
tum that had been achieved by the general mobilization, wilted. 
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The Soviet View of Munich 
The evening of 26 September brought the realization of the worst possible scenario 
from the Kremlin's point of view. A conference on Czechoslovakia of major European 
powers, but excluding the Soviet Union, was more than ominous. Pravda of 26 September 
for once agreed with Churchill's opinion that the British government, faced with the choice 
between dishonor and war, had chosen dishonor only to receive war. Pravda added its 
own commentary: "there is still time. The English government may avoid dishonor and 
prevent war. Otherwise, it will have both." Izvestia on the same day reproduced the text of 
the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 1935 and drew attention especially to the fact that Soviet 
assistance was conditional on prior French action. It concluded that in case of French re-
fusal to assist Czechoslovakia "the Soviet government in the literal sense of the Treaty is 
free from all obligations vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia." 
The Kremlin must have felt desperate: the Munich conference meant that the Soviet 
Union would be isolated and, in the future, sacrificed to Hitler, whose appetite had been 
whetted by Austria and Czechoslovakia. There were only two ways out of the situation. 
One, Czechoslovakia must be persuaded to fight, cost what it may. The French, Moscow 
hoped, would then be shamed into marching on Prague's behalf sooner or later. Two, if 
Czechoslovakia did not fight, then the Kremlin must participate in the Munich Conference. 
The two alternatives were immediately explored. 
First, came an attempt to lure Czechoslovakia into active military resistance. On 27 
September, a deputy of the Soviet Chief Air-Marshal made an offer that stunned the 
Czechoslovak General Fajfr: the Soviet Union was prepared to fly 750 military aircraft im-
mediately to Czechoslovakia. The offer was accepted, with many thanks. And no one 
heard about it again. To strengthen Prague's determination to resist militarily, Moscow 
supplied other leads. It claimed it had "30 infantry divisions drawn up in the areas in the 
immediate vicinity of the Western frontiers .. . . The units have been accordingly reinforced 
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with reservists. With regards to technical troops -- aviation and tank units -- they are in full 
readiness." This was as untrue as the previous offer of750 aircraft. 
Simultaneously, Soviet diplomats were trying to win a seat for themselves at an in-
ternational conference dealing with the Czechoslovak crisis. Litvinov had mentioned such a 
conference already on 5 September, but he was ignored. He tried again on 28 September. 
The U.S. Embassy in Moscow received a note from the Soviet government reacting to the 
personal appeal of Franklin D. Roosevelt to Hitler and Benes. The Soviet note stated that 
Moscow accepted the U.S. proposal to assist in the prevention of war. The USSR is 
"prepared to support the proposal put forward by the Government of the United States of 
America for the calling of an international conference and to take an active part therein." 
The confused U.S. charge, Kirk, did not understand: the Soviets were thanking the U.S. 
for an invitation that had never been extended to them in the first place. There are obstacles 
in the Anglo-French mediation of the Czechoslovak crisis, the Soviets responded, indicat-
ing to Kirk that they could do a better job. Kirk viewed the episode as surreal. Clearly, 
there was going to be no seat reserved for a Soviet delegation in Munich, although Benes 
and Fierlinger had hoped that the Soviet government would be represented. 
Now that there was going to be neither war nor a Soviet delegation in Munich, 
Moscow resorted to its last strategy. The General Secretary of the Comintern, Georgi 
Dimitrov, had been dispatched to Prague on 14 September. He stayed throughout the crisis 
until 4 October. Dimitrov's mission was to organize the "utmost resistance against any 
concession in the Sudeten question" mainly among "students, young officers, left social 
democrats , liberal left journalists, workers and trade union leaders . ... [T]he Comintern 
wants to translate anned resistance against Germany into the creation of the first Soviet 
stronghold in Central Europe." 
It was all very clever but it did not work. Despite their enormous desire to partici-
r-- . pate at Munich, the Soviets had been left out. Ironically, this is precisely what would make 
the Soviet Union quite popular when the symbol of Munich would acquire some rather un-
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pleasant connotations. Yet, had Litvinov attended the Munich Conference there is no telling 
how he would have behaved on the issue of Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity. 
The Czech messengers received the harsh verdict in Munich at 2:15a.m. on 30 
September. They left Munich at 6 a.m. and flew to Prague. At 7:30a.m. Benes sent for 
the Soviet Ambassador, Alexandrovsky. He asked him three questions and insisted that the 
answer be delivered within four hours, i.e., by 11:30 a.m. of 30 September. Benes had 
chosen 11:30 a.m. because the Czechoslovak government was expected to meet at that 
time. 
These were the three questions: (1) What will be the Soviet attitude if Czechoslo-
vakia refuses Munich and fights alone? (2) Is the Soviet Union ready to render immediate 
military assistance without France, disregarding the attitude of the League of Nations? (3) 
How would the Soviet Union react if Czechoslovakia surrendered? 
According to official Soviet records, Alexandrovsky cabled the three crucial ques-
tions to Moscow at 11 :20 a.m., only ten minutes before the answers were needed. Benes's 
government met as planned at 11:30 a.m. and accepted the Munich Diktat. It had done so 
without any knowledge and understanding of the Soviet position. In fact, at 12:15 p.m. the 
Prague Castle telephoned the Soviet Embassy, saying that the answer was no longer 
needed. Alexandrovsky promptly sat down and sent a message to Moscow that "Benes no 
longer insists on an answer . .. because the Government has already passed a decision to 
accept all the conditions. Occupation of the Sudeten district by German troops will begin 
tomorrow morning." 
This was the right time for the Kremlin to spring into action. The Czechoslovak 
Ambassador was summoned to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs where he received a 
very positive answer to the three questions submitted by Benes on 30 September at 7:30 
a.m. The "Soviets had been prepared to help us in any case," Fierlinger reported from 
Moscow to Prague, "under any circumstances; they would have gone with us even in spite 
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of Munich, had we refused it." Benes received this communication on 2 October at 11 
p .m. 
Historians who believe that the Soviet Union was prepared to assist Czechoslovakia 
in a militarily meaningful manner during the 1938 crisis almost invariably quote this pas-
sage. But, as Ivan Pfaff demonstrated, the Soviets talked to Fierlinger 58 hours after 
Benes's questions had been asked, 54 hours after Benes had accepted the Munich Diktat, 
and 36 hours after the German troops moved to occupy the Sudetenland. 
Under the circumstances, the Kremlin was dealing only with hypotheticals. It had 
nothing to lose by providing affirmative answers to questions rendered irrelevant by the 
course of events. In reality, the Soviet Union did not intend to deploy its armed forces and 
assist Czechoslovakia against Germany. 
The Soviet Union's role during the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938 remains unclear 
because neither Moscow nor Prague has made its archives fully available to researchers. 
With this caveat, a working hypothesis can be offered: after the AnschlujJ, when Prague 
became the main target of German aggression, Soviet diplomats exposed Czechoslovak 
President Benes to conflicting information regarding Moscow's plans in case of a shooting 
war. On the one hand, they attempted to strengthen Prague's willingness to resist if at-
tacked by Germany. On the other hand, when the situation dangerously escalated in May 
and September, the Soviet Union withdrew and allowed events to progress without any 
Soviet intervention. There is some unverified evidence indicating that, having failed to 
achieve for itself a seat at the 1938 conferences dealing with Czechoslovakia, the Soviet 
Union may have sought to manipulate Prague into an open conflict with Hitler, in which the 
Red Army would have remained a passive observer. 
In the end, nobody won. Neither the Czechs and the Czech Jews, now standing 
naked before the Gestapo. Nor the Sudeten Germans who, as new citizens of the German 
Reich, were impressed into a Wehrmacht division which would be almost pulverized at 
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---· Stalingrad. And certainly not Great Britain and France who would have to endure six years 
of World War II. And Stalin's Soviet Union? Having been excluded from the Munich 
Conference, a conference it wanted to attend, the Soviet Union now attacked "the pseudo-
pacifist fog" spread by Chamberlain and the French Premier Edouard Daladier so that those 
who had been badly beaten by Hitler could appear "in a triumphant light." Let us not be 
sentimental about Czechoslovakia, urged Izvestia, much more is still to come. The 
Conference of Munich had not done away with war, it had only postponed it; there would 
be new demands by Hitler and the democracies would have to deal eventually with their 
own fears and dilemmas. 
Unlike Benes, whose tactical victories resulted in strategic failures, Stalin suffered 
many tactical defeats, only to crown them with a strategic success. Exclusion from the 
Munich charade would turn into an advantage for the Soviet leader. By 1945, every one of 
the Munich protagonists would be either dead or discredited. But Joseph Stalin would be 
well on the way toward the creation of a powerful empire. And Czechoslovakia, the apple 
of discord at Munich, would soon become one of the empire's crown jewels. 
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